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Previous studies have shown that delay discounting (DD), the tendency to prefer smaller-
immediate to larger-delayed rewards, decreases following vivid imagination of future
events. Here, we test the hypothesis that imagining complex events alternative to direct
(perceptual) experience, whether located in the future, the past, or even the present,
would reduce DD. Participants (N = 250) imagined future events (Future condition),
remembered past events (Past condition), imagined present events (Present-imagine
condition), or reported on the current events (Present-attend condition), and then made
a series of intertemporal choices about money and food. Compared to attending to the
present, imagining the future reduced DD, but this only held for individuals who claimed
vivid pre-experiencing of future events. Importantly, a similar attenuation of DD was
found in the Past and Present-imagine conditions, suggesting that a shift in perspective
from the perceptual present towards mentally constructed experience can downplay
the appraisal of immediate rewards in favor of larger-delayed rewards, regardless of the
location of the imagined experience in subjective time.
Keywords: delay discounting, episodic future thinking, imagination, intertemporal choice, mental time travel
INTRODUCTION
Intertemporal choice requires trading off between options attainable at different times. One
example is deciding whether to spend the afternoon rambling or instead stay home and do
work in view of a future exam. Individuals tend to prefer immediate rewards to long-term
rewards of larger value. Formally, this phenomenon reflects the decrease in subjective value of
a reward as the delay until its receipt increases, known as delay discounting (DD; Frederick
et al., 2002; Sellitto et al., 2011). The rate at which future rewards are discounted (DD
rate) varies widely across individuals (Soman et al., 2005; Peters and Büchel, 2011) and is
particularly high in clinical conditions characterized by impulsive and shortsighted behavior,
for example, addicted subjects (Kirby and Petry, 2004; Bulley and Gullo, 2017), compulsive
gamblers (Holt et al., 2003), obese individuals (Amlung et al., 2016), and patients with lesions to
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC; Sellitto et al., 2010; Peters and D’Esposito, 2016).
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Indeed, individuals with high vs. low impulsivity show greater
difference between immediate and delayed reward outcomes
in the reward positivity, an ERP component reflecting reward-
related signals in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Schmidt
et al., 2016). Importantly, DD rates have been found to vary
greatly also within individuals (Peters and Büchel, 2011; Lempert
and Phelps, 2016), depending on contextual variables and
ongoing cognitions (Berns et al., 2007), which is relevant for
understanding the component processes governing DD, as well
as conceiving ‘‘cognitive tools’’ to contrast it.
Recent research has shown that episodic future thinking
(Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007; Schacter et al., 2007, 2017;
D’Argembeau et al., 2010), the mental simulation of events
relevant to one’s own future, reduces DD. Peters and Büchel
(2010) compared a standard DD task with a modified task in
which personal future events imagined at given delays were
provided as cues during intertemporal choices involving rewards
available at those delays. In the episodic cue (compared to the
standard) task, individuals’ preferences shifted towards future
rewards, and the reduction of DD rates was associated with
the vividness of the imagined future event and with increased
functional coupling between the hippocampus and vmPFC and
ACC regions associated with reward processing and valuation
(Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Peters and Büchel, 2010; Benoit et al.,
2011). The effect of episodic cueing on DD is consistently found
in healthy individuals (Benoit et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2013; Lin and
Epstein, 2014; Bromberg et al., 2017; O’Donnell et al., 2017, 2018;
Zhang et al., 2018; Bulley et al., 2019), as well as patients with
substance abuse disorders (Daniel et al., 2013; Snider et al., 2016),
in whom it extends to real-world indices of impulsive choice,
such as impulsive drinking or eating (Daniel et al., 2013; Dassen
et al., 2016; see also Wu et al., 2017). In contrast, consistent with
Peters and Büchel’s (2010) finding that episodic cueing effects
on DD are conditional upon the imagination of vivid future
events, no episodic cueing effect has been observed in amnesic
patients with hippocampal damage (Palombo et al., 2014; but
see Kwan et al., 2015), who cannot construct detail-rich future
events (Race et al., 2011; see also De Luca et al., 2018) to use
for decisions.
How does episodic future thinking promote future-oriented
choice? One view is that the vivid imagination of future
events triggers emotions in the here-and-now (Gilbert and
Wilson, 2007; Damasio, 2009), rendering future rewards more
emotionally engaging and desirable, and therefore capable to
compete for salience with rewards that are available immediately
(Boyer, 2008; Ciaramelli and di Pellegrino, 2011; Cole and
Berntsen, 2016). There is some evidence, indeed, that positive
but not negative episodic future thinking reduces DD (Liu et al.,
2013; Zhang et al., 2018), although other research using large
samples has detected episodic cueing effects even following
neutral (Lin and Epstein, 2014) and even negative future thinking
(Bulley et al., 2019). Episodic future thinking may also alter
participants’ time perspective (Lin and Epstein, 2014), increase
personal connectedness to the future (O’Donnell et al., 2017),
and promote a more concrete and detailed construal of future
events (Cheng et al., 2012; Lebreton et al., 2013), biasing
choice accordingly.
Although most studies so far have investigated the effect
of episodic future thinking on DD (e.g., Peters and Büchel,
2010; Benoit et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2013; Lin and Epstein,
2014), self-projection into the future correspondingly entails a
detachment from direct (perceptual) experience, and it is possible
that this inherent component of mental time travel is capable, in
itself, to attenuate DD, at least in part. If so, imagining any event
alternative to the present experience should reduce DD. There is
initial evidence that this is the case. Lempert et al. (2017) found
that autobiographical memory retrieval reduced DD, suggesting
that projecting oneself into the past also helps overcome the bias
towards immediate gratification (see also Ersner-Hershfield et al.,
2009; Mitchell et al., 2011).
Despite this initial evidence, it is still unclear whether
reducing DD via self-projection would necessarily require the
imagination of events located in the future, or rather, imagining
any event removed from the perceptual present would suffice.
Consistent with the latter possibility, overlapping brain regions
are engaged while individuals mentally project themselves
in situations alternative to the present, be these located in
the future, located in the past, alternative versions of the past
(e.g., counterfactual thinking), or even atemporal (Addis et al.,
2007, 2009; Hassabis et al., 2007; De Brigard et al., 2013; Benoit
and Schacter, 2015). Also, DD was found negatively associated
with mind-wandering, such that individuals prone to shifts of
attention away from current tasks/events towards inner thoughts
(e.g., memories, plans; Smallwood et al., 2011) are also those
more capable to wait for larger-later rewards (Smallwood et al.,
2013), and both mind-wandering and patient intertemporal
choice relate to gray matter volume in vmPFC (Bernhardt et al.,
2014) and are hindered by vmPFC damage (Sellitto et al., 2010;
Bertossi and Ciaramelli, 2016).
The first aim of the present study is to test whether
imagining the future, remembering the past, and imagining
an alternative present, as all instances of self-projection away
from perceptual towards mentally constructed experience, are
(equally) effective in reducing DD compared to maintaining
attention on the present. This would contribute to specify
the component processes underlying episodic cueing effects
on DD and to reveal viable alternatives to reduce DD. The
second aim of the study pertains to degree of retrieval support
and structure characterizing episodic cueing of intertemporal
choice. In most studies, individuals first imagine future
experiences, and then tags reminding of these experiences
are embedded in single trials of the DD task. This heavily
structured cueing is highly effective in reducing DD, but
may be difficult to adapt flexibly to clinical practice demands
and, even more so, to adopt spontaneously in daily life. In
fact, individuals often resort to extemporaneous ‘‘metacognitive
tools’’ to exert control over disadvantageous mental processes.
For example, we ‘‘count to ten’’ before we act when angry,
and thoughts about the future are reportedly used in daily
life to direct action (D’Argembeau et al., 2011). Thus, here
we ask whether imagining events removed from the perceptual
present before (with no cue during) intertemporal choice
would make choices less present-oriented and more farsighted,
reducing DD.
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To these aims, four participant groups imagined future events,
remembered past events, imagined alternative present events, or
described the current events, and then underwent standard DD
tasks involving monetary or food rewards. We expect to replicate
that self-projection into the future would reduce DD compared
to attending to the present, and that the episodic cue effect on
DDwould depend on the vividness of future thinking (Peters and
Büchel, 2010; Palombo et al., 2014). If the effect of episodic future
thinking on DD is mediated, at least in part, by the detachment
from the present inherent to future thinking, then a reduction of
DD should be observed also when participants remembered the
past or imagined an alternative present.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants in the study were 250 healthy individuals (mean age:
35.60 years, range: 19–75; mean education: 15.24, range: 5–23)
recruited at the Bologna and Cesena campuses of the University
of Bologna, who gave informed consent to participate according
to the Declaration of Helsinki (International Committee of
Medical Journal Editors, 1991) and the Bioethical Committee of
the University of Bologna. Participants were randomly assigned
to four different groups, namely, the Future group (N = 59),
the Past group (N = 56), the Present-imagine group (N = 72),
and the Present-attend group (N = 63), which did not differ in
gender distribution, age, education level, body mass index (BMI;
Aiello et al., 2018), and the order of administration of the two
intertemporal choice tasks described below (H< 1.23, p> 0.57 in
all cases; see Table 1 for the groups’ characteristics).
Time Tasks
Before the intertemporal choice tasks, participants either
attended to the present or re-/pre-/experienced an event
alternative to the current experience. Participants in the Present-
attend group were required to focus on their current experience.
They had to list on a paper sheet what was on their desk, then
look around and describe in as much detail as they could the
environment they were immersed in and what was happening
at that moment. Participants in the Past group were required
to remember, one at a time, two specific events from their past
as vividly as they could (i.e., trying to re-experience the events
while recalling them): the first occurred about 1 year before, and
the second occurred about 3 years before. They then described
the events briefly on a paper sheet. Participants in the Future
group were required to imagine, one at a time, two events that
might happen to them in the future as vividly as they could
TABLE 1 | Participant groups’ characteristics.
Group F:M Mean age Mean education BMI
(years) (years)
Present-attend 32:31 35.4 (13.0) 15.0 (2.4) 23.0 (3.2)
Past 31:25 36.2 (13.6) 15.1 (2.8) 23.5 (3.2)
Future 33:26 35.4 (13.6) 15.2 (3.2) 23.6 (4.2)
Present-imagine 43:29 35.4 (13.6) 15.6 (3.1) 23.2 (3.7)
Notes. F, females; M, males; BMI, body mass index. Numbers in parenthesis are SDs.
(i.e., trying to pre-experience the events while imagining them):
the first to occur in about 1 year and the second in about
3 years. They then described the events briefly on a paper sheet.
Lastly, participants in the Present-imagine group imagined and
then described, one at a time, two events that might happen to
them in the present, different from the one they were currently
experiencing, but that could be located in the same spatial context
and involve the same people/objects. The emotional content
(positive vs. negative) of (re)constructed experience was not the
focus of our experimental question/manipulation. Nevertheless,
to promote the vivid simulation of events alternative to the
perceptual present, we encouraged participants to remember or
imagine something positive or neutral in nature, which they
would feel comfortable re-/pre-/experiencing in detail.
Across experimental conditions, after having
described/remembered/imagined each event, participants rated,
on a 5-point Likert scale (ranging from 1 = ‘‘a lot,’’
to 5 = ‘‘not at all’’), the degree to which they felt that:
(1) describing/remembering/imagining that event was easy
(difficulty scale); (2) describing/remembering/imagining
that event elicited emotions (emotion scale); and
(3) they were attentive to the present (in the case of the
Present-attend group) or vividly re-/pre-/experiencing an
alternative (past/future/present) event (in the case of the
Past/Future/Present-imagine groups; vividness scale).
Intertemporal Choice Tasks
Immediately after the time task, participants underwent two
intertemporal choice tasks measuring DD for two different types
of hypothetical reward, namely, food and money, previously
described in Sellitto et al. (2010). We used chocolate bars
as the food reward after assuring all participants liked and
could eat chocolate. In each computerized task, subject chose
between an amount of reward that could be received ‘‘now’’
(smaller-immediate reward) and an amount of reward that
could be received after a specific delay (larger-later reward;
Sellitto et al., 2010). Participants made five choices at each
of six delays of availability of the larger-later option: 2 days,
2 weeks, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, and 1 year. The order
of blocks of choices pertaining to different delays was randomly
determined across participants.Within each block of five choices,
the delayed amount was fixed at 40 units (40e, 40 chocolate
bars), whereas the amount of the immediate reward was adjusted
based on the participant’s choices using a staircase procedure
that converged on the amount of the immediate reward that
was equal, in subjective value, to the delayed reward (Sellitto
et al., 2010; Sellitto and di Pellegrino, 2016). In each block, the
participant always chose between a delayed amount of 40 units
and an immediate amount of 20 units. If the participant chose
the immediate reward, the amount of the immediate reward
decreased in the following trial; if the participant chose the
delayed reward, the amount of the immediate reward increased
in the following trial. The adjustment size on the immediate
reward decreased with successive choices: the first adjustment
was half of the difference between the immediate and the delayed
reward, whereas it was half of the previous adjustment for later
choices (Myerson et al., 2001). This procedure ended when the
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subject had made five choices at one specific block (delay), after
which a new series of choices at another delay began. For each
trial in a block, the immediate amount that would have been
presented on the sixth trial of a delay block was taken as the
estimate of the ‘‘indifference point’’ between smaller-immediate
and larger-later rewards, thus representing the subjective value of
the delayed reward at that delay.
We assessed DD rates estimating the area under the curve
(AUC; Myerson et al., 2001; Sellitto et al., 2010; Peters and
D’Esposito, 2016). Delays and subjective values were first
normalized. Delays were expressed as a proportion of the
maximum delay (360 days), and subjective values were expressed
as a proportion of the delayed amount (40 units). Delays and
subjective values were then plotted as x and y coordinates,
respectively, to construct a discounting curve. Vertical lines were
drawn from each x value to the curve, subdividing the AUC into
a series of trapezoids. The area of each trapezoid was calculated as
(x2 − x1)(y1 + y2)/2, where x1 and x2 are successive delays, and
y1 and y2 are the subjective values associated with these delays.
The AUC is the sum of the areas of all the trapezoids. The AUC
varies between 0 and 1. The smaller the AUC, the steeper DD,
the more participants were inclined to choose small-immediate
rewards over larger-delayed rewards.
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants filled in a demographics
questionnaire, then performed one of the time tasks, and
finally underwent the food and money DD tasks, administered
in a counterbalanced order.
Statistical Analyses
All our variables (Kolmogorov-Smirnov d> 0.08, p< 0.01), with
the exception of the AUC for money (d = 0.06, p > 0.20), were
non-normally distributed, and therefore, we analyzed our data
mainly resorting to non-parametric statistics. Between-group
differences were assessed with Kruskal–Wallis ANOVAs and
Mann–WhitneyU tests, within-group differences withWilcoxon
matched-pairs tests and correlations with the Spearman test. To
provide as informative an analysis of participants’ performance
as possible, data on the AUC for money, normally distributed,
were additionally analyzed using parametric ANOVA. Unless
otherwise noted, we report effects significant at p < 0.05,
two-tailed.
RESULTS
Whole Sample
Subjective Ratings
We first compared the self-reported levels of difficulty, emotion,
and vividness associated with attending to the present vs. an
alternative past/present/future event by running Kruskal–Wallis
ANOVAs on individuals’ subjective ratings (see Table 2). We
found group differences in difficulty (H = 27.35, p < 0.0001),
such that participants found imagining future events, imagining
present events, and remembering past events more difficult
than describing the present (Z > 3.66, p < 0.001 in all
cases), whereas remembering and imagining events were rated
TABLE 2 | Subjective ratings in the time task.
Group Mean Mean Mean
difficulty emotion vividness
Present-attend 1.4 (0.6) 4.3 (0.9) 2.2 (1.1)
Past 2.0 (0.9) 2.4 (1.0) 2.4 (1.0)
Future 2.0 (0.9) 2.1 (0.8) 2.2 (1.0)
Present-imagine 2.0 (0.8) 2.8 (0.8) 2.5 (0.8)
Notes. Numbers in parenthesis are SDs.
as comparably difficult (p > 0.75 in all cases). There were
also significant differences in emotion ratings (H = 109.04;
p < 0.0001): remembering the past (Z = −2.40, p = 0.02) and
imagining the future (Z = −4.55, p = 0.0005) elicited more
emotions than imagining an alternative present, which in turn
elicited more emotions than describing the present (Z = 7.57,
p = 0.00001). Finally, participants reported experiencing the
present or alternative past, present, and future events with
comparable levels of vividness (p = 0.08).
DD
Despite differences in the subjective experience associated
with the different time conditions, Kruskal–Wallis ANOVAs
on AUCs showed no significant group difference for either
monetary or food rewards (bothHs< 1.4, ps> 0.27), suggesting
that detaching from the present to experience an alternative event
does not generally result in a change in DD rates (see Figure 1A).
Consistent with previous reports (Odum and Rainaud, 2003;
McClure et al., 2007; Sellitto et al., 2010), food rewards were
discounted more steeply than money across groups (Wilcoxon
Z > 3.08; p < 0.002 in all cases). An ANOVA on AUCs for
money with group as between-subject factor confirmed no effect
of group (F(3,246) = 1.22; p = 0.30).
Exploratory Correlations
We ran exploratory Spearman correlation analyses to investigate
the relation between AUC rates and demographic and individual
variables (age, education, and BMI) and subjective ratings
(emotion, vividness, difficulty). The Bonferroni-corrected
significance level was p < 0.004. The analyses showed that the
AUC for money and food did not correlate significantly with
age (p > 0.38 in both cases), education (p > 0.14 in both cases),
BMI (p > 0.10 in both cases), emotion ratings (p > 0.13 in both
cases), vividness ratings (p > 0.71 in both cases), or difficulty
ratings (p> 0.02 in both cases).
High Vividness Subsamples
Based on previous findings that self-projection into the future
reduced DD significantly only in participants who reported
having imagined future events with high vividness (Peters and
Büchel, 2010; Palombo et al., 2014; see also Lin and Epstein,
2014), we reasoned that the lack of cueing effects in this study
may relate to participants not having succeeded at re-/pre-
/experiencing vividly events alternative to the present in the
Past, Future, Present-imagine conditions, or at fully attending
to the present in the Present-attend condition, blurring cueing
effects on DD. We therefore restricted our analyses to subgroups
of participants who reported the highest level of vividness
(score = 1) in at least one of the two events they had remembered
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FIGURE 1 | Area under the curve (AUC) for money and food in the Past,
Future, Present-attend, and Present-imagine groups of the whole sample (A)
and of the high vividness sample (B). Error bars indicate the SEM, and
asterisks denote significant findings (p < 0.05).
from the past (Past_v group; N = 25), imagined to occur in
the future (Future_v group; N = 23), imagined to occur in
the present (Present-imagine_v group; N = 16), and described
from the present (Present-attend_v group; N = 24). The high
vividness subgroups were still matched for gender distribution,
age, education level, and BMI (H < 5.60, p > 0.13 in all cases;
see Table 3 for groups’ characteristics). Also, high vividness
participants (collapsing across subgroups; N = 88) did not differ
in age, education, gender balance, or BMI (all ps > 0.10) from
participants in the whole sample who never reported having
experienced alternative past/present/future events vividly or fully
attended to the present (N = 162).
Subjective Ratings
Kruskal–Wallis ANOVAs on subjective ratings in the high
vividness groups (Past_v, Future_v, Present-attend_v, Present-
imagine_v), displayed in Table 4, showed group differences
in difficulty ratings (H = 9.68, p = 0.02), such that vividly
remembering past events (Z = 2.62, p = 0.02) and imagining
present events (Z = 2.82; p = 0.01) were perceived as more
difficult than attending to present events, whereas differences
between imagining the future and attending to the present
(p = 0.06), or between remembering and imagining (future
TABLE 3 | High vividness groups’ characteristics.
Subgroup F:M Mean age Mean education BMI
(years) (years)
Present-attend_v 15:10 30.1 (10.2) 15.7 (2.7) 22.5 (2.7)
Past_v 12:11 36.1 (14.9) 14.0 (2.9) 23.4 (3.4)
Future_v 10:12 36.4 (15.5) 13.8 (4.0) 22.6 (3.0)
Present-imagine_v 7:9 36.4 (13.2) 15.6 (2.2) 23.3 (2.7)
Notes. F, females; M, males; BMI, body mass index. Numbers in parenthesis are SDs.
TABLE 4 | High vividness groups’ ratings in the time task.
Group Mean Mean Mean
difficulty emotion vividness
Present-attend_v 1.1 (0.4) 4.6 (0.9) 1.4 (0.6)
Past_v 1.8 (1.2) 2.0 (1.1) 1.6 (1.0)
Future_v 1.5 (0.9) 1.7 (0.7) 1.3 (0.5)
Present-imagine_v 1.7 (0.8) 2.2 (1.2) 1.4 (0.5)
Notes. Numbers in parenthesis are SDs.
and present) events were not significant (p > 0.45 in all
cases). Emotion ratings also differed across groups (H = 47.17;
p = 0.0001), such that participants reported more emotions in
association with remembering past events (Z = 5.31; p < 0.001)
and imagining future (Z = 5.61; p < 0.001) and present
events (Z = 4.94; p < 0.001) than with attending to present
events. Imagining future events was associated with similar
levels of emotion than remembering past events (p = 0.26),
but elicited more emotions than imagining present events
(Z = 2.79; p = 0.005). Group differences in vividness were not
significant (p = 0.065).
DD
In the high vividness groups, AUCs for money and food were
normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov d < 0.10; p> 0.20),
and therefore, group differences were assessed with parametric
tests. An ANOVA on AUCs with group (Past_v, Future_v,
Present-attend_v, Present-imagine_v) and reward (food, money)
as factors yielded a significant effect of reward (F(1,84) = 28.70;
p < 0.001), such that food was discounted more steeply
than money across groups, and a significant effect of group
(F(3,84) = 3.40; p = 0.02). Post hoc comparisons, run with the
Newman-Keuls tests, showed a reduced DD in participants who
vividly remembered past events (p = 0.04), imagined future
events (p = 0.03), and imagined present events (p = 0.03)
compared to those who focused on the present before making
intertemporal choices, while there were no significant differences
across the Past_v, Future_v, and Present-imagine_v groups
(p > 0.62 in all cases; see Figure 1B). We obtain similar findings
using non-parametric statistics.
Exploratory Correlations
Spearman correlation analyses (Bonferroni-corrected
significance level: p < 0.004) showed that, in the high vividness
groups, the AUC for money and food did not correlate
significantly with age (p > 0.20 in both cases), education
(p > 0.54 in both cases), BMI (p > 0.81 in both cases), difficulty
ratings (p > 0.33 in both cases), or vividness ratings (p > 0.64 in
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both cases). However, participants who reported higher levels
of emotion in the time task were also those who showed
lower DD rates for money (rSpearman = −0.33, p = 0.001). The
correlation between emotion ratings and AUCs for food was not
significant (p = 0.41).
DISCUSSION
Previous research has shown that engaging in episodic future
thinking during intertemporal choice reduces individuals’
natural disposition towards immediate gratification in favor of
choices with long-term benefits, attenuating DD (e.g., Peters and
Büchel, 2010; Benoit et al., 2011; Daniel et al., 2013; Lin and
Epstein, 2014; Dassen et al., 2016; Bromberg et al., 2017; Bulley
and Gullo, 2017; Bulley et al., 2019). In most DD tasks, episodic
future thoughts are instilled in intertemporal choice using online
cues that point to (previously imagined) experiences to occur
at the relevant task delays. Episodic cueing of intertemporal
choice results in increased activity in a core network associated
with episodic future thinking (Benoit and Schacter, 2015) and
in increased functional coupling between the hippocampus and
vmPFC and ACC regions that relates directly to individuals’
shifts in preference for future options (Peters and Büchel, 2010).
These findings suggest that episodic future thinking up-regulates
the salience and utility of future relative to immediate choice
options in the valuation system, biasing preference accordingly.
Indeed, episodic cueing effects on DD are contingent upon
the vividness of episodic imagery (Peters and Büchel, 2010;
Palombo et al., 2014).
Two main questions motivated the present study. First,
we sought to inquire further on the mechanisms mediating
episodic cueing effects on DD by asking whether imagining
any event alternative to direct (perceptual) experience, whether
located in the future, the past, or even the present, would be
able to reduce DD. Second, we tested whether episodic future
thinking and other types of event construction would modulate
DD even if subjects mentally projected themselves in time
before the DD task and had no reminder of their mental time
travel during the task. Our results show that imagining future
events, remembering past events, and imagining present events
before making intertemporal choices are equally associated with
reduced DD compared to maintaining attention on the current
event. This finding confirms and extends previous evidence that
autobiographical memory retrieval reduces DD (Lempert et al.,
2017), and that the number of episodic details produced during
autobiographical memory retrieval correlates negatively with DD
rates (Peters et al., 2017). Notably, this effect was not detected
across participants, but focusing on those who self-reported
having succeeded fully in the time task, experiencing vividly a
mentally constructed past/future/present event as opposed to
staying focused on the perceptual present, which were about
one-third of the original sample. This finding not only makes
contact with the tight relation observed between episodic cueing
effects on DD and the quality of episodic simulation (Peters and
Büchel, 2010; Palombo et al., 2014; Peters et al., 2017), but also
draws attention to the fact that mentally traveling in subjective
time is a demanding activity. We will return to this point later.
Our main finding that self-projecting into constructed
experience, whether located in the future, past, or present,
was associated with reduced DD compared to attending to the
perceptual present indicates that the well-documented effect of
episodic future thinking on DD is attributable, at least in part, to
component processes episodic future thinking shares with other
instances of self-projection, as testified by shared neural bases
(Addis et al., 2007, 2009; Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Hassabis
et al., 2007; Nyberg et al., 2010; Kurczek et al., 2015; Bertossi
et al., 2016). Which component processes of self-projection
may underlie the DD decrease? First, imagining the future,
imagining an alternative present, and remembering the past all
entail a detachment from direct experience and processing of
information that is not present to the senses. Activity in several
nodes of the core autobiographical network, such as the medial
prefrontal cortex (Burgess et al., 2003; Gilbert et al., 2006) and
the posterior parietal cortex (Cabeza et al., 2008; Ciaramelli et al.,
2008; see also Nyberg et al., 2010), has been conceptualized as
mediating the allocation of attention to internal (vs. external)
sources of information, a process inherent to memory retrieval.
Directing attention away from perceptual reality towards inner,
mentally constructed experience may downregulate the appraisal
of immediate rewards, reducing the valuation gap normally
present between immediate and future rewards, hence DD
(Ballard and Knutson, 2009; Smallwood et al., 2011; Macrae et al.,
2017). Consistent with this interpretation, mind-wandering,
the drift of attention away from external tasks/events towards
internally generated information (e.g., thoughts, memories,
plans; Smallwood et al., 2011), which is characterized by reduced
cortical analysis of external events (Smallwood et al., 2008; Kam
et al., 2011), is also associated with low DD rates (Smallwood
et al., 2013). In addition, the vivid simulation of future, past,
and present events alternative to the current experience likely
mobilized construction/elaboration processes that also operate
while anticipating what receiving a reward in the future would be
like. These processes may have promoted a detailed imagination
of future outcomes, which is associated with low DD rates
(Hakimi and Hare, 2015; for a discussion see Bar, 2010). Indeed,
activity in vmPFC (Mitchell et al., 2011; Cooper et al., 2013) and
the hippocampus (Lebreton et al., 2013) while thinking about
the future predicts individual DD rates. Moreover, steep DD
correlates with impaired mental time travel in vmPFC patients
(Bertossi et al., 2016).
It should be noted that participants self-reported more
emotion in the Past, Future, and Present-imagine conditions
compared to the Present-attend condition. Given that we
encouraged the (re)construction of relatively positive events, one
may wonder whether reduced DD merely related to positive
affect. We do not think this is the case. Had positive affect played
a major role in the reduction of DD in the high vividness sample,
the same reduction would have been detected in the whole
sample, as even the whole sample self-reported more emotion
in the Past, Future, and Present-imagine conditions compared to
the Present-attend condition. However, there was nomodulation
of DD across time conditions in that sample. In addition,
emotion ratings did not correlate with DD in the whole sample,
but only in the high vividness sample. That is, it is not emotion
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in general that necessarily related to DD, but emotion associated
with an actual shift of the self in time, which participants in the
high vividness—but not the whole—sample experienced. These
findings suggest that constructed experience is most effective in
reducing DD when emotionally engaging, in addition to vivid
and detailed. In line with our data, in Lempert et al. (2017),
DD decreased following autobiographical memory retrieval,
but not non-mnemonic (non-personally relevant) imagery. We
take emotional adherence to constructed experience as proof
of a reliable disengagement from the present and adoption
of a different self-perspective, which reinforces our hypothesis
of a link between DD and self-projection. Clearly, our data
do not allow for specifying which specific component process
of self-projection is most closely tight to the DD reduction
(e.g., disengagement from the present, detailed simulation of the
alternative event, emotional engagement with the event), which
remains a topic for future inquiry.
As for the second aim of the study, our results suggest that a
significant reduction in DD can be observed even if individuals
engage in self-projection before making intertemporal choices,
without having any further cue during choice itself. This finding
is worth noting as it makes contact with new research aimed at
delineating the boundary characteristics within which episodic
cueing manipulations are effective in altering DD (O’Donnell
et al., 2017, 2018; Hollis-Hansen et al., 2019). For example, in
most previous experiments, participants create cues about future
events that occur at the time delays of the DD task, which are then
represented during the task. Hollis-Hansen et al. (2019) have
found recently that DD is reduced even when the episodic future
cues do not match the temporal delays of the task, suggesting that
the generation of episodic future cues might in itself be enough
to increase the valuation of future rewards (see also Stein et al.,
2017). Our results are in line with these findings, and also indicate
that the constraint to have episodic cues located in the future
may also be not necessary, provided that imagined events are
vivid enough to have the potential to draw attention away from
information present to the senses, towards inner experience.
In summary, we have found that mentally constructing vivid
events alternative to perceptual experience is associated with
reduced DD rates compared to attending to the perceptual
present, no matter the precise (past, future, present) location
of constructed experience in subjective time. This finding
points to self-projection as an effective, adoptable, and
generalizable strategy to protect one’s intertemporal decisions
from impulsivity.
We conclude by highlighting the limitations and future
directions of this work. One limitation is that we used a
between-subject design. Therefore, even though we controlled
for a considerable number of demographical and individual
variables (age, education, BMI), we cannot exclude that the
observed effects are due, at least in part, to group differences
in uninvestigated variables, and it will be important to confirm
them using within-subject designs. As anticipated, our data
indicate that self-projection is not trivial an activity: only
one-third of our sample succeeded in assuming the desired time
perspective in the time task. Future studies should therefore
inquire into the experimental conditions that facilitate self-
projection, for example, manipulating the personal relevance
(D’Argembeau and Mathy, 2011; Cole and Berntsen, 2016; Cole
et al., 2016) or familiarity (Robin and Moscovitch, 2014) of
episodic cues, or even basic spatial attention processes proven
capable to orient individuals in (past vs. future) time (Anelli et al.,
2016), to embed them in more refined cued DD protocols.
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